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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts 
FREDERICK M. HART 
§4.1. Introduction. It has often been argued that certainty is 
desirable, if indeed not necessary, in that branch of the law which 
adjusts rights in commercial disputes. Entrepreneurs have the re-
sponsibility of weighing business risks, but, as far as possible, they 
should be relieved of the danger that their commercial judgments may 
be frustrated by some novel legal decision. There is another attractive 
attribute of certainty which appeals to some students of jurisprudence 
- it has a tendency to decrease litigation. Where the law clearly 
defines rights and liabilities, the commercial community can adjust its 
actions accordingly and disputes may often be settled by nonjudicial 
means. 
The Uniform Commercial Code and its predecessors, the uniform 
acts, are prime examples of the attention given by lawmakers to 
clarifying the law in the commercial area. Judicial handling of 
commercial cases often evidences the same interest in providing 
established guidelines for the businessman. Stare decisis becomes a 
stronger maxim. Equity, in the broad sense of the term, is gently 
shoved behind a billboard advocating strict use of rules and principles 
so that the pure, albeit intricate, system that ties together the trans-
actions of the business world may be assembled as pieces that are 
interlocked in a jigsaw puzzle. Each individual part, no matter how 
queerly shaped, goes to make the whole. The completed scene is the 
end to be attained, the parts individually having limited value and 
scant beauty. 
But the picture is never quite complete. Imagination can indicate 
what it is supposed to look like since most of the pieces are in place-
or are they? Has not there been a mistake? That piece there, right in 
the middle, which looks like consideration, certainly is correctly placed. 
Yet here is another of similar shape and dimension but appearing 
to be promissory estoppel. Certainly one can be substituted for the 
other. And glance at that corner over there: the pieces obviously 
must lie side by side but they do not fit together. The convex side of 
one meets the protrusions of the other so that the assembler must allow 
one to overlap the other. But which one is to be placed atop? 
FREDERICK M. HART is Associate Professor at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars. He is a recompilation 
editor of Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.). 
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During the 1961 SURVEY year the courts of Massachusetts dutifully 
performed their task of settling commercial controversies. Of those 
that reached the Supreme Judicial Court none indicate any strong 
trends nor are there any decisions which have the likelihood of being 
regarded as landmarks in the law. Still several are interesting enough 
to report herein. Some have added certainty to the law; others dealt 
with issues previously doubtful without shedding appreciable light 
on the judicial attitude in relation to their solution. Neither in-
dividually nor collectively do the cases resolve the fundamental 
question of contract law: Should the law shape and mold business 
activity or should it be content with attempting to assist parties in 
attaining their reasonable expectations? 
§4.2. Output contracts: Discontinuance of business: Good faith. 
Output and requirements contracts have successfully weathered various 
attacks and gained general acceptance as enforceable agreements.1 
They are specifically recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code,2 
which provides that the rights and duties of the parties are to be 
governed largely by the elastic concept of good faith. Under the code 
provision the terms of the contract are still the preponderating 
determinant of the parties' obligations, but where the action of the 
promisor or promisee prevents the other party from realizing on his 
reasonable expectations, liability will result unless the action was 
taken in good faith.s The workability of the good faith test is 
evidenced by its successful application in numerous pre-code cases.'" 
An example of its use, in the context of a particular problem inherent 
in all output and requirement contracts, is found in Neofotistos v. 
Haroard Brewing Co.," which was decided during the 1961 SURVEY 
year. 
The plaintiff in this action agreed to purchase, and the defendant 
to sell, all of the spent grain resulting from the defendant's production 
of malt beverages at its Lowell plant. The contract extended over a 
five-year period, and the price was to be determined bimonthly by an 
agreed method but in no case was to be less than a stated minimum. 
The contract was performed from its inception in May of 1955 until 
November of 1956. At this time the defendant ceased the production 
of malt beverages because, in its judgment, their manufacture had 
become unprofitable.6 Subsequently the business was sold, but the 
§4.2. 1 See Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 Ill. 
L. Rev. 1 (1932). 
2 Uniform Commercial Code §2·306, C.L., c. 106, §2·306. 
3 See Note, Requirements Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 102 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 654 (1954). 
'" See Mass. Code Comment to C.L., c. 106, §2·306; 1 Williston, Contracts §104(a) 
(3d ed. 1957). 
Ii 341 Mass. 684, 171 N.E.2d 865 (1961). 
6 It was stipulated that for the year ending September 30, 1955, defendant had an 
operating loss of $163,142.55 and a net loss of $184,582.43. For the year ending 
September 30, 1956, the operating loss was $183,900.60 and the net loss was $267,-
502.12. Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 685, 171 N.E.2d 865, 
866 (1961). 
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Lowell plant was not reopened by the purchaser. The plaintiff, 
alleging breach of contract, sued and recovered a jury verdict. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict should have been granted and ordered judgment entered for 
the defendant. 
In its opinion the Court discusses three prior Massachusetts cases: 
Proctor v. Union Coal Co.} Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Union St. Ry.,8 
and McNally v. Schell.9 The significance of the Neofotistos decision is 
better understood if viewed in the light of these decisions. 
In Proctor v. Union Coal Co.,l° the plaintiff sold land to the de-
fendant. As part of the sales agreement the defendant promised to 
furnish ice from a pond on the land as required by the plaintiff for his 
home and business. When the land was subsequently resold and the 
plaintiff was unable to procure ice from the pond, suit was brought 
on the contract and the plaintiff was allowed to recover. To under-
stand the dissimilarity between Proctor and Neofotistos, it should be 
noted that the Proctor case involved a requirements contract while 
the agreement in the Neofotistos case was for the defendant's output. 
Although the two are similar in many ways, they also differ. In the 
requirements contract the vendor's obligation is determined by the 
needs of the vendee, while in the output contract the purchaser's 
duty is measured by the production of the seller. Thus, in the require-
ments contract the vendor's obligation will vary depending upon the 
action of the vendee who has the power and right to alter his require-
ments, at least within limits. The converse is true in the output 
contract, as the vendee must take all of the vendor's goods. 
In both the Proctor case, which involved a requirements contract, 
and the Neofotistos case, which involved an output contract, the 
defendant was the supplier. The distinction between the two cases is 
obvious. In Proctor the defendant had no discretion whatever in the 
amount of ice to be given to the plaintiff - he obligated himself to 
supply all that the plaintiff required. In Neofotistos, however, the 
quantum of the defendant's promise was to vary, under the express 
terms of the contract, in response to decisions made by him subsequent 
to the time the parties entered into the contract. It was for him to 
decide the extent of his obligation by deciding how much malt bever-
age he should produce. The vital issue in Neofotistos, therefore, was 
whether he could exercise his determinative power to its extreme by 
producing nothing. 
Eastern Mass. St. Ry. v. Union St. Ry.11 was neither a requirements 
nor output contract in the strict sense. The defendant, owner of 
certain railroad freight facilities, entered into an agreement with the 
plaintiff whereby they both were to share these facilities during a five-
7243 Mass. 428, 137 N.E. 659 (1923). 
8269 Mass. 329, 168 N.E. 781 (1929). 
9293 Mass. 356, 199 N.E. 748 (1936). 
10243 Mass. 428, 137 N .E. 659 (1923). 
11269 Mass. 329, 168 N.E. 781 (1929). 
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year period. Either party had the right to revoke the agreement by 
giving a six-month notice. The plaintiff gave notice and then im-
mediately discontinued freight operations, thereby eliminating its 
need for use of the facilities. In a suit brought by the plaintiff for a 
sum alleged to be the balance due under the contract while it was 
actually performed, the defendant's answer set up, by way of recoup-
ment, the allegation that plaintiff had breached its contract to use the 
facilities. 
The Court, holding that the plaintiff had failed to perform its 
obligations under the contract, stated: 
The defendant assumed the risk of the volume of the plaintiff's 
business but did not assume the risk of its voluntarily giving up 
that business. . .. The provisions of the contract, when inter-
preted in the light of the circumstances and purposes to be ac-
complished, mean that the plaintiff was under an obligation to 
carry on a freight trolley business and not to stop the normal flow 
of business. . .. The continuation of that business was essential 
to the carrying out of the terms of the contract and hence an 
agreement to that effect is implied.12 
Although the case did not involve an output contract, the tenor of the 
opinion is opposed to the result in Neofotistos. There is no clear 
theoretical distinction between the two cases. In both, performance 
of the party sought to be charged was dependent upon his continued 
operation of his business, but in one the Court found an implied 
promise not to go out of business while in the other it did not. 
The last case which the Court distinguished is McNally v. Schell,13 
which also involved a contract that falls without the strict definitions 
of output and requirements contracts. In this case the plaintiff was 
hired to collect rents in a building owned by the defendant. The 
plaintiff promised to perform this work for five years, but there was no 
specific promise by the defendant to continue his employment for any 
stated period of time. Before the elapse of the five years, the de-
fendant sold the building thereby making it impossible for the plaintiff 
to perform under the contract. It is important to look at the issue as 
posed by the Court: Was the agreement revocable at the pleasure of the 
defendant? Holding that the plaintiff could recover damages under 
the contract, the Court found an implied promise by the defendant 
"not to disable the plaintiff from their performance of services." 14 
Although the way in which the opinion is worded suggests that the 
case has applicability to requirements and output contracts, in reality 
it does not. The Court clearly, and correctly, considered the cases as 
posing only the question of whether the contract of employment was 
12 269 Mass. at 332, 168 N.E. at 782. 
13 293 Mass. 356,199 N.E. 748 (1936). 
14 293 Mass. at 360, 199 N .E. at 749. 
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terminable at the will of the defendant. Once finding, from the 
circumstances and terms of the agreement, that it was not, the method 
by which the defendant breached his promise was immaterial. 
The Court in Neofotistos distinguished the above three cases simply 
on the ground that in each designated property was devoted to the 
purposes of the contract and that "in the particular circumstances 
a promise to hold the property for that use during the term of the 
contract was implied." 15 In the N eOfotistos contract the Court found 
no agreement by the defendant to produce any specific amount of malt 
beverages at the Lowell plant. Therefore, the Court concluded that: 
Since there was no express obligation for the defendant to pro-
duce, there was no implied obligation to continue production. 
The only implied promise that the plaintiff could reasonably 
assume from the contract was that the defendant would carry out 
its agreement in good faith and do nothing to interfere with 
normal production.16 
Whether the Proctor, McNally, and Eastern Mass. St. Ry. cases are 
easily distinguishable, the decision of the Court in N eofotistos is sound. 
In accord with the prevailing majority rule,17 it would also seem to be 
in agreement with the Uniform Commercial Code.18 
One final comment should be made about the case and the extent 
of its holding. The goods to be sold under the agreement, spent grain, 
was a by-product of the seller's manufacturing process, and he ceased 
production not because the manufacture of this by-product was un-
profitable, but because the operation of his plant - the purpose of 
which was to produce malt beverages - was showing a 10ss.19 The case 
should be restricted to similar facts and not extended to cover the 
situation where the vendor ceases production of the product being 
sold under an entire output contract because that contract has itself 
proved a bad bargain for him. If, for instance, a contract were for 
the entire output of a particular product and at a fixed price, and the 
price of that product rose sharply during the term of the contract, 
the seller should not be allowed to avoid the contract by ceasing 
production. The risk of such an increase was a part of the bargain.2o 
§4.3. Postemployment obligations: Covenants not to compete. In 
16341 Mass. 684, 688, 171 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1961). 
16341 Mass. at 689,171 N.E.2d at 868. 
17 See I Williston, Contracts §104A (3d ed. 1957). 
18 Note, 102 u. of Pa. L. Rev. 654, 659 (1954). 
19 In the Neofotistos case the defendant seller apparently protected himself against 
such a bad bargain. The agreement provided for a sliding price scale. Neofotistos 
v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 686, 171 N.E.2d 865, 866 (1961). 
20 Cf. Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code §2-306: "A shut-down by a 
requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permissible when a shut·down merely 
to curtail losses would not." 
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both 19591 and 196()2 extensive articles appeared surveying the law 
governing postemployment covenants which restrict an employee's 
activities after the termination of the employment relationship. A 
third was published in 1961.3 All suggested that the danger to an 
employer of a trusted employee's disclosing trade secrets or misusing 
confidential information has greatly increased under prevailing labor 
market conditions wherein movement of key personnel from one 
company to a competitor is commonplace. As if to substantiate the 
authors' concern, the Supreme Judicial Court considered three cases4 
during the 1961 SURVEY period which directly involve an employee's 
obligations after termination of his employment contract. Another 
case,1I although it arose from the sale of a business rather than an em-
ployment contract, had similar overtones. 
Of these cases, New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann6 produced 
the longest and in some ways the most helpful opinion. The plaintiff 
was a family corporation that had dealt for an extended period in a 
specialized type of wearing apparel, the styles of which are important 
and vary seasonally. There were two defendants: a salesman who had 
been with the company for a number of years and a sales manager 
who was the first person from outside the family to be trusted with 
company secrets. The salesman originally worked under a written 
contract requiring him to keep secret customer lists, prices, and other 
matters pertaining to the business. At the time of his defection he 
was on an oral year-to-year contract which the Court found to contain 
like terms. The sales manager understood when he assumed his 
position that he would keep inviolate trade and business secrets. 
The defendants, while still in the employ of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, set up a competing company in conjunction with a third party. 
A period of double-dealing followed until eventually both resigned 
and began to compete openly. Customer lists were taken, information 
relative to suppliers heretofore closely guarded by the corporation was 
used by the new enterprise, and both customers and suppliers of the 
plaintiff were solicited by the defendants on behalf of the new com-
pany. Suit was brought, which resulted in an award of damages and a 
decree enjoining the defendants from soliciting or communicating 
§4.3. 1 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1959); 
Levin, Non-Competition Covenants in New England: Part I, 39 B.U.L. Rev. 482 
(1959). See also Coleman and Cole, Effect of Shifting Employment in Trade Secrets, 
14 Business L. 319 (1959). 
2 Levin, Non.Competition Covenants in New England: Part II, 40 B.U.L. Rev. 
210 (1960). 
3 Von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1961). 
4 American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1259, 178 N.E.2d 5; New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1113, 176 N.E.2d 193; Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 
175 N.E.2d 374. 
II Slate Co. v. Bikash, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1231, 177 N.E.2d 780. See also Bonneau 
v. Meaney, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 178 N.E.2d 577. 
61961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 176 N.E.2d 193, also noted in §5.4 infra. 
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with customers in the New England states, New York, and Penn-
sylvania. 
The principal contention of the defendants considered by the Court 
was the argument that Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v. Silva7 had estab-
lished a rule for this jurisdiction that injunctive relief would be 
granted an employer, in absence of an express contract, only in situa-
tions involving new or secret inventions and processes or knowledge of 
special circumstances. In rejecting this interpretation of the W ooll-
ey's case, the Court stressed a part of that opinion8 which indicates 
that the deciding factor in such litigation is whether the knowledge or 
information the use of which the employer is attempting to restrain is 
confidential. Finding this to be the test, and that the information 
used by the defendants was within this category, the Court upheld the 
injunction. 
The relief granted, a decree restraining the employees from soliciting 
customers of their former employer, was the same that was denied in 
the Woolley's case. It is interesting that in distinguishing the New 
England Overall Co. case from it, reliance was not placed upon the 
possible ground that there was here an express contract not to use 
customer lists, but rather on the less definite concept that the informa-
tion was confidential. Although the result reached by the Court 
appears just, it is difficult to determine what criteria the Court used to 
distinguish confidential from nonconfidential information. Perhaps 
the Court was impressed with the fact that in the New England 
Overall Co. case it appeared that the information was not readily 
available to the public and probably could not have been easily 
obtained by one outside the corporation, whereas in Woolley's (which 
involved a laundry routeman who solicited his former customers 
after he went into business on his own) anyone could ascertain his 
customers and pertinent facts about them by following him as he 
covered his route. Or perhaps the manner in which the employer has 
himself treated the information is significant; or again, the Court may 
have been impressed with the value of the information to the business. 
Assuming that the Court's specific reaffirmation of the Woolley's 
decision and rationale9 adds to the stature of that opinion, the primary 
importance of New England Overall Co. is its indication of how the 
former opinion is to be read. Customer information is not to be 
categorically denied protection in absence of a physical taking or 
express contract. Whether such information is confidential is to be 
the primary issue, and this will depend upon the facts of the case. It 
7304 Mass. 383,23 N.E.2d 899 (1939). 
8 "The questions to be determined in each case are whether the knowledge or 
information, the use of which the employer seeks to enjoin, is confidential. and 
whether, if it be confidential in whole or in part, its use ought to be prevented." 
Woolley'S Laundry. Inc. v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 389, 23 N.E.2d 899, 902 (1939). 
9 The Court stated that "in rejecting the defendant's contentions, we reaffirm the 
result and the reasoning of the Woolley's Laundry case." New England Overall 
Co. v. Woltmann, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1113, 1119, 176 N.E.2d 193, 198. Cf. Case 
Note, 29 Ky. L.J. 247 (1941). 
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should be noted, however, that the New England Overall Co. case 
discloses grossly improper activities by the defendants, some of which 
did not directly relate to the acts restrained. Whether the injunction 
would have been affirmed in absence of such conduct is to be seriously 
doubted. 
The definition of confidential information in this context was also 
involved in American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen.1° 
Here the defendant had been the president and a director of the 
plaintiff corporation in which either he or his wife was a minority 
stockholder. He was deposed as president and almost immediately 
thereafter established a competing window cleaning service. Ap-
parently impressed by the fact that this was a "business which could 
not be conducted surreptitiously," 11 the Court held that the successful 
solicitation of regular customers of his former employer did not 
amount to grounds for recovery of damages. The Court said: 
There is no basis . . . for a conclusion that the defendant used 
confidential information in soliciting the plaintiff's regular cus-
tomers. Remembered information as to plaintiff's prices, the 
frequency of service, and the specific needs and habits of particular 
customers was not confidential.12 
The Court then proceeded to make a fine distinction. The defend-
ant had submitted a bid for regular service to one of the plaintiff's "ir-
regular'" 13 customers prior to leaving the company. He had also pre-
pared a revision of the bid which was submitted by another employee 
before the defendant left. Immediately after being voted out as 
president, the defendant went to this irregular customer, informed 
him that he was establishing his own company, was shown a copy of 
the revised bid by the customer, and was given a contract for the service 
when he undercut the bid by a slight amount. This, the Court found, 
was an actionable wrong entitling the plaintiff to damages. The 
Court stated that the defendant had 
appropriated to his own purposes his work done for the plaintiff. 
While employed, he had established a pre-contract relationship 
between the plaintiff and an irregular customer which in due 
course was likely to ripen into a contract. Knowledge of this was 
special corporate information. Interference with that relation-
ship, immediately upon discharge ... and with the use of 
plaintiff's bid, ... was unfair. [Defendant], in the circumstances, 
in using the plaintiff's figures as his own, stood little better than 
if he had used a copy of the figures carried away by him.14 
101961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1259, 178 N.E.2d 5. 
111961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261, 178 N.E.2d at 7. 
121961 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262, 178 N.E.2d at 8. 
18 A customer for whom work had been done two or three times during the pre-
vious five years. 
14 American Window Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1259,1264,178 N.E.2d 5, 9. 
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Admitting, as the Court does,15 that if the defendant had not been 
in the employ of the plaintiff he would have been free to use the figures 
disclosed to him by the customer, the opinion furnishes few clues as to 
why recovery was allowed. Several reasons may be surmised for the 
Court's decision, but none is satisfactory. It may be argued, for 
instance, that use of the calculations contained in the plaintiff's bid 
was tantamount to a physical taking of the bid itself, but the same 
should also be said for remembered information about customers' 
habits and needs. Or the theory may be advanced that the work 
done on the bid by the defendant became the "property" 16 of the 
plaintiff and therefore could be used only by him, but such reasoning 
applies with equal vigor to any beneficial contacts or good will 
established by the employee during his tenure irrespective of whether 
a firm contract or only a pre-contractual relation resulted. 
Both New England Overall Co. v. Woltmann and American Window 
Cleaning Co. of Springfield v. Cohen indicate that the Supreme Judicial 
Court has a renewed interest in affording protection to that class of 
knowledge gained by an employee during his tenure which the Court 
categorizes as "confidential information." It is impossible to define or 
delimit the term from the opinions in these two cases, and prior deci-
sions of the Court afford little guidance. The distinguishing character-
istic of the protected class of information seems to be its inaccessibility 
to a competitor who has no inside connections. The American Win-
dow Cleaning Co. case demonstrates that this cannot be applied as a 
rigid test but that it is at most a flexible guide. 
The third case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the 
past year in the postemployment area, Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. 
Shevrin,17 presented entirely different issues. The defendant-employee 
had been given access to confidential information during his nine 
years with the plaintiff company. Over the years he had embezzled 
in excess of $130,000 from the plaintiff, which led to his discharge and 
the commencement of criminal proceedings against him. During the 
criminal prosecution he agreed to restore the money taken and also 
to refrain from competing with the plaintiff during the following 
three years. Subsequently, upon his violation of the agreement not 
to compete, an injunction was granted restraining him from selling 
articles, of the type produced by the plaintiff, during the three-year 
period. 
In attempting to reverse the decree, the defendant unsuccessfully 
argued that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable because it was 
not ancillary to an employment contract. Two separate and inde-
pendent issues are raised by the defendant's contention: (1) whether 
the policy favoring free competition is unduly and unreasonably cur-
tailed by the restrictions,18 and (2) whether the agreement not to 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cf. Di Angeles v. Scavzillo, 287 Mass. 29,191 N.E. 426 (1954). 
171961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973,175 N.E.2d 374. 
18 See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1959). 
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compete was supported by sufficient consideration.19 Usually, courts 
have placed little emphasis on the second of these issues. They have 
either found that the restrictive covenant is ancillary and necessary to a 
superior bargain between the parties and thus enforceable under the 
Mitchel v. Reynolds20 doctrine, or they have found that the restrictive 
covenant was not a subordinate part of a broader contract and hence 
enforceable as an unreasonable restraint on trade. Where the covenant 
has been found ancillary, consideration flowing from the main agree-
ment is obviously present in most cases; where the covenant is not 
ancillary, the courts have seldom reached the consideration question 
since enforcement has been denied on the broader principle. 
The defendant's agreement not to compete cannot be considered 
ancillary to a contract with the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff and the 
district attorney promise to forbear from prosecuting the criminal 
case. However, as the Court holds, the restrictive covenant was ancil-
lary to a permissible transaction: the defendant's agreement to make 
restitution. The Court's decision that this is not an unreasonable 
restraint of trade is sound. If the law, through the use of criminal 
sanctions, could have incarcerated the defendant for his acts, it should 
not be held that a lesser restraint is against the public policy favoring 
free competition. 
The Court's treatment of the applicable sections of the Restatement 
of Contracts is, however, far from satisfactory. Section 515 provides 
that, in the absence of statutory authorization or dominant social or 
economic justification, a restraint of trade is unreasonable and hence 
unenforceable under Section 514 if it "is based on a promise to refrain 
from competition and is not ancillary either to a contract for the 
transfer of good-will or other subject of property or to an existing 
employment or contract of employment." 
It is clear that in the absence of social or economic justification the 
covenant sued upon in the Novelty Bias Binding Co. case must be 
held to be unenforceable if the Restatement is to be followed. The 
Court, however, refuses to recognize this, and attempts to avoid the 
section by referring to Comment a of the section, which reads in part: 
. . . no implication is intended that all bargains that do not fall 
within these rules are legal. They mayor may not be. Section 
516 states some bargains that are reasonable and therefore legal; 
but there is a territory between the two Sections . . . which is 
not covered by the rules stated in either section. [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
The Court finds that the covenant in the instant case is one which 
falls within the lacuna between the two sections. Note what it does to 
come to this conclusion. The first sentence of Comment a is distorted 
to read that "no implication is intended that bargains that do fall 
within this section are illegal." The Comment does not say this, 
196 Corbin, Contracts §1395 (1951). 
20 1 P. Wms. 181,24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). 
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and to infer that it means this is a glaring example of reverse logic. 
And again, the Court, in holding that the covenant in the case falls 
between Sections 515 and 516, must completely overlook the fact that 
Section 515 specifically covers the situation. The Court would have 
been on firmer ground, and would have averted possible confusion, 
if it had simply rejected the Restatement rul~ as too narrow or had 
clearly held that there was sufficient "social justification" for its result. 
Although the consideration issue is not discussed as a separate 
problem, the opinion hints at the fact that it may have troubled the 
Court. After noting the plaintiff's right to recover the money stolen 
in a civil action, and after inferring that the reparation agreement 
was an important factor in the disposition of the criminal case, the 
Court stated: 
The defendant doubtless desired to avoid imprisonment; the 
plaintiff obviously desired that the good will of the businesses be 
protected from one who at liberty could do it immediate and 
grievous harm. In the circumstances disclosed, we think considera-
tion of public policy, equity and fair dealing favor enforcement 
of the covenant if it is otherwise reasonabhi.21 
The conclusion of the Court appears correct, and the above state-
ment is not objectionable if it is directed only to the question of 
whether the restraint is illegal on the ground that it is opposed to 
policy favoring free competition. However, since the above is phrased 
in words of bargain and exchange, a danger arises that the inference 
might be drawn that the Court is holding forbearance in the criminal 
prosecution, either by the plaintiff or by the district attorney, to be 
sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. Even in face 
of the statutory encouragement given reparation agreements,22 the 
stifling of a prosecution cannot constitute good consideration.23 It is 
proper, however, to settle or to promise to forbear from prosecuting 
a civil action even though this be intertwined with a criminal prosecu-
tion.24 It is the plaintiff's forbearance in the civil action, if anything, 
that furnishes the consideration in the Novelty Bias Binding Co. case 
for the defendant's promise not to compete. 
The extent of the restriction in the case is also worthy of mention. 
Originally, the covenant covered a twenty-eight state area in which the 
plaintiff transacted business. This was narrowed to twenty-six states 
by the trial court on the ground that in two of the states the amount 
of business conducted by the plaintiff was negligible. The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the decree in whole, reiterating its prior 
21 Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 976, 175 N.E.2d 
374,376. 
22 See G.L., c. 266, §61; id., c. 276. §92. 
236 Corbin, Contracts §1421 (1951). 
24 Ibid. 
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rejection211 of a rule which would limit the restrIctlOn to the geo-
graphical territory in which the employee worked. 
Slate Co. v. Bikash,26 the last case to be reported in this section, was 
an action brought to enforce a restrictive covenant given in conjunc-
tion with the sale of a business. Two of the defendants, Bikash and his 
wife, owned and operated a wholesale candy and tobacco business 
in the city of Quincy. Their son-in-law, Kaitz, had worked with them 
until October of 1956 when, with their financial assistance, he pur-
chased a similar business in Boston. In August of 1957 Bikash and 
his wife sold their business to the plaintiff agreeing that they would 
not "directly or indirectly . . . engage in the wholesale candy and 
tobacco business . . . in a capacity where they will personally solicit, 
directly or indirectly, retailers for the purpose of selling at wholesale 
... nor do anything to the prejudice of the good will." 
In September of 1957 Kaitz formed a new corporation and moved 
his operations to Quincy. Previously, during July of that year, he had 
offered employment to several employees of his father-in-law's com-
pany, telling them that he intended to change the location of his 
business. After moving to Quincy, Kaitz was successful in soliciting 
former customers of his father-in-law. 
This action was brought on the ground that Bikash had violated 
his restrictive covenant not to compete. The only specific act which 
the plaintiff could prove in support of his case was that Bikash had 
assisted his son-in-law at the time Kaitz moved to Quincy by signing 
as a co-maker on a note given to secure additional capital for the new 
enterprise. Finding that no publicity had been given to this transac-
tion, and that Bikash had not used his business acumen in assisting 
his sOlT-in-law, the Court affirmed a decree adverse to the plaintiff. 
The concatenated facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the 
plaintiff definitely made a bad bargain in purchasing the business 
from the Bikashes, and that the defendants may well have executed a 
clever plan to sell the "good will" of their business while still passing 
on the benefits of that good will to their son-in-law. However, the 
decision of the Court is sound for it is difficult to see how, or even why, 
relief should be granted under the facts proved by the plaintiff. There 
was no violation of the covenant not to compete, nor did the Bikashes 
themselves undermine the good will of the business. Unfortunately 
for the plaintiff, the son-in-law was in a favorable position to compete, 
but the possibility of someone's having such an advantage should have 
been realized prior to the purchase. 
§4.4. Notice of exercise of option. An option bears such a close 
resemblance to an offer that it is often called simply an irrevocable 
211 See New England Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 1I06 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 
(1940). See also Bonneau v. Meaney, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1465, 178 N.E.2d 577, which 
held a covenant not to compete for twenty years reasonable. 
261961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 12111, 177 N.E.2d 780. 
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offer. 1 Where the promisor has received consideration for his promise 
not to revoke, it is said that he is disabled from withdrawing the 
power of acceptance given to the offeree. Professor Corbin apparently 
believes that the option may be more satisfactorily explained. He 
looks upon the promisor's primary promise to do or refrain from doing 
an action at the option holder's election as a contract from its very 
inception, performance of which is conditional upon the option 
holder's proper exercise of his right.2 Under his view, no new contract 
arises when the option is exercised, the option holder's election "merely 
pushes an already existing contractual obligation one step further 
along its way, turning the duty of [the party giving the option] that 
was conditional . . . into a duty that is no longer so conditional." 3 
It may be argued that Professor Corbin's analysis is an interesting 
theoretical observation which has a certain fascination for those 
interested in legal gymnastics, but as a practical matter it is unimpor-
tant. But look for a moment at one of the cases decided during the 
past year, Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank.4 
The plaintiff, Cities Service, held an option to purchase land which 
it was leasing. The pertinent clause of the lease provided that the 
"tenant shall have the option during the term of this lease . . . to 
purchase ... for the sum of $17,000 ... payable as follows ... 
$200.00 on notice of intention to exercise this option . . . , [the option 
to] be exercised by the tenant giving to the landlord written notice 
of its intention to purchase . . ." 5 The lease terminated on September 
1, 1959. On the evening of August 31, 1959, the plaintiff mailed 
notice of its intent to exercise the option with a draft for $200 from its 
New York City office. This arrived on September 1 and was promptly 
returned. 
The primary issue presented to the Court was whether the option 
had been exercised during the term of the lease. This depended upon 
whether the notice was effective when mailed or when received. The 
Court, in holding that the notice was late, interpreted the terms of the 
option to imply that notice and payment of the deposit were required 
so that "the purchase and sale contract [would] have been completed 
within the lease term." 6 This could have been accomplished, in the 
§4.4. 1 Simpson, Contracts §20 (1954). 
2 "[The promisor's] promise is from the very beginning a binding contract, his 
duty to [perform] being conditional on notice by [the option holder] . .. The 
sending of such notice ... is not merely the acceptance of an offer; it is also 
the performance of a condition precedent to [the] duty of immediate performance." 
I Corbin, Contracts 873 (1950). 
8 Id. at 875. 
4342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961). 
I} Ibid. 
6342 Mass. at Ill, 172 N.E.2d at 106. Although it is possible to interpret the 
Court's opinion as holding that a formal purchase and sales agreement was required 
during the term of the lease, see quote at note II infra, it is probable that the Court 
meant that the giving of notice and payment of the $200 would have automatically 
resulted in a sufficient contract if received during the term of the lease. 
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Court's opinion, by sending the notice and the deposit so as to be 
received before the expiration of the lease. 
Keeping in mind the two views of an option, namely, as an irrev-
ocable offer and as a conditional contract, it is both interesting and 
beneficial to speculate on the approach taken by the Court in reaching 
its decision, especially since the opinion is somewhat less than clear in 
expressing the Court's rationale. Four avenues were available: 
1. The general rule,7 which mayor may not apply in Massachusetts,S 
that an acceptance is effective upon mailing might have been rejected. 
2. The acceptance upon posting rule could have been held inap-
plicable to option contracts on the ground that the rule is itself an 
exception, and should not be extended to similar but different 
situations.9 
3. The Court could have adopted Professor Corbin's view of the 
option and held that the conditions to the defendant's duty to convey 
had not occurred. 
4. The words of the option could have been examined to ascertain 
the manifested intent of the parties and the conclusion drawn that they 
had provided for the expiration of the option unless notice was 
received while the lease was still operative. 
The importance of ascertaining the approach of the Court is that 
the case must take its place as authority in this jurisdiction. The 
decision is certain, but the applicability of the decision will vary in 
accord with the rationale applied by the Court. If the Court believed 
that this was a simple case of offer and acceptance, the case could be 
cited as a reaffirmation of McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. CO.lO On the other 
hand, if either of the last two theories were adopted, the case has no 
bearing on the time an acceptance of an offer becomes effective. 
It appears that the Court, influenced perhaps by the Corbin concept 
of the option, rested its decision on the ground that the words used 
in the option require receipt of notice during the term of the lease. l1 
7 Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. Be Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818); see 1 Williston, 
Contracts §81 (3d ed. 1957). 
S Compare McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278 (Mass. 1822), with Brauer v. 
Shaw, 168 Mass. 198,46 N.E. 617 (1897). 
9 See 3 Williston, Contracts §853 n.15 (rev. ed. 1936). 
10 1 Pick. 278 (Mass. 1822). 
11 "The words in the grant of the option 'during the term of this lease or any 
extension or renewal thereof' modify, we think, the words which follow them, that 
is 'to purchase the real estate.' It is an 'option during the term . . . to purchase.' 
The lease sets out the agreement that in the event of prescribed action during the 
term of the lease there would arise a bilateral contract of purchase and sale. The 
conditions for this contract arising are the giving of notice and the payment of $200 
'on notice of intention to exercise this option.' Although the provisions as to the 
$200 payment is not in the statement: 'This option shall be exercised by the Tenant 
giving ... written notice of its intention to purchase: the requirement that the 
payment be made 'on notice of intention' is express, and shows the intention to have 
a purchase and sale agreement effective upon the down payment being made, in this 
respect conforming to the usual practice in respect of agreements for the sale of 
real property." Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 
174 N.E.2d 104, 105 (1961). 
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Thus it seems that the question of whether an acceptance is valid upon 
posting is unaffected by this decision. 
§4.5. General. Various reasons require careful selection of cases 
for extended discussion in this SURVEY. Several decisions which were 
not treated at length do appear worthy of mention. 
Four such cases involved governmental contracts. In Essex-Lincoln 
Garage, Inc. v. City of Boston/ the Court denied a bill seeking rescis-
sion of a lease of a public parking facility where a change in the 
direction of traffic on a one-way street resulted in a diminution of 
business. The Court rejected the argument that continuance of the 
traffic pattern was an implied condition of the lease on the ground 
that the lease was detailed and indicated an attempt to express the 
entire contract of the parties. Also rejected was the plaintiff's con-
tention that the doctrine of frustration should apply. 
McClean Heating Supplies, Inc. v. School Building Committee of 
Springfield2 reiterated the Court's prior position that G.L., c. 149, 
§44H (which provides that sub-bids shall be rejected if incomplete) 
should be interpreted reasonably in light of its purpose of protecting 
the public. In this case a bid containing an obvious clerical error was 
held acceptable. 
Singarella v. City of Boston8 raised the issue of whether approval of 
a contract by the Mayor of Boston given before execution of the 
contract was sufficient to satisfy Acts of 1890, c. 418, §6, as amended by 
Acts of 1950, c. 216, §1.4 This statute requires the mayor's approval 
of contracts made by city departments when the amount involved 
exceeds $1000. The Court, in holding the prior approval sufficient, 
relied upon a literal reading of the statute and the argument that the 
mayor's duty to exercise his sound judgment and practical wisdom 
might be fulfilled as well before as after the actual execution of the 
contract so long as he had a full understanding of all of its terms. 
Costonis v. Medford Housing AuthoritylS involved a contract which 
provided that no change in its terms would be effective without 
approval of the State Housing Board. In affirming a judgment for 
additional expenses claimed by a modification of specification ordered 
by a Government employee charged with administering the contract, 
the Court held that the trial judge's finding that the employee had 
apparent authority to agree to changes was not unreasonable. 
D'Aloisio v. Morton's, Inc.6 is basically a bailments case, but it has 
value for the lawyer interested in contracts. The plaintiff left a fur 
§4.5. 11961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 979,175 N.E.2d 466. 
2341 Mass. 322,169 N.E.2d 741 (1960). 
8342 Mass. 385,173 N.E.2d 290 (1961). 
4 The Court held that its decision would not be affected by either Acts of 1952, 
c. 376, §l, or Acts of 1955, c. 60, §l. These statutes were not considered applicable 
as no showing was made that they had been accepted by the city council. Singarella 
v. City of Boston, 342 Mass. 385, 387 n.l, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 n.l (1961). 
IS 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 176 N.E.2d 25. 
6342 Mass. 231,172 N.E.2d 819 (1961). 
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coat with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the defendant for storage and 
repair. She could not herself read English, but was accompanied by 
her daughter, a college student, who acted for her. When she de-
posited the coat, the plaintiff signed a document clearly marked as a 
"storage receipt and contract" which, on the reverse side, limited 
the liability of the defendant to $300. The coat disappeared and 
upon demand of its return the defendant tendered $300. The Court 
held that the document was a contract, not merely a receipt; that 
the plaintiff was bound by its terms, even if she had not read them, by 
virtue of her daughter'S understanding of their import; and that the 
limitation applied to the defendant's liability for negligence as well 
as its liability under the bailment contract. However, the limitation 
was held not to affect the defendant's liability for conversion. 
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